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FOREWORD
In April 1994, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute
hosted its Fifth Annual Strategy Conference. The theme was "The
Revolution in Military Affairs: Defining an Army for the 21st Century."
After fourteen of the nation's leading defense scholars presented
papers on the role of technology in warfare, Dr. Paul Bracken and
Colonel Raoul Alcala concluded the conference by offering their views of
the Army's future.
Professor Bracken contends that the Army of the 21st century will
be shaped by domestic concerns as much as by external threats to
American security. While economic power has increased in importance in
international relations, military power as traditionally conceived
remains a dominant factor in determining the status of nations.
Colonel Alcala holds that there is a connection between ideas and
principles. He argues that doctrines will provide the basis for force
structure, training, and weapons acquisition. Colonel Alcala maintains
that the Army's ability to stay intellectually ahead of the technology
will be, perhaps, its greatest challenge in the next century.
To contribute to an informed debate about the 21st century Army,
the Strategic Studies Institute presents the views of these respected
defense intellectuals for your consideration.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR THE ARMY
Paul Bracken
The best way to think about a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
comes from a statement often heard in business strategic planning
circles: It is easier to design the future than it is to predict it. To
think about a revolution in military affairs as a predictive problem
misses many of the most important parts of such an exercise. The
responsibility of the national security community is to consider the
impact of such a development precisely because it is a national security
community. Other nations may move in this direction, and if ours does
not, some extremely serious imbalances could follow. Although the end of
the cold war is recognized by all, and although the unique conditions of
the Gulf War are understood not to characterize all future U.S.
conflicts, a considerable gap exists between saying these things and
actually absorbing them into our institutions. This conference is about
taking a step in this institutional redirection: making the change from
talking about revolutionary change to having it influence the Army's
day-to-day actions.
In an article published a few months ago I argued that current
thinking about national security was too constrained by immediate
issues. Downsizing of force structure, budget reductions, Bosnia, and
other issues were all very real problems requiring a great deal of
leadership and management to properly deal with them.1 But there was a
subconscious tendency to use these immediate issues as signposts of the
future, even though little evidence existed to support such a use. From
many years of experience in long-range planning at the Hudson Institute
came some difficult lessons learned. The hardest single feature in
conducting long-range planning and brainstorming sessions for both
government and private sector clients was to divorce oneself from
current conditions. In the 1960s, for example, a great many planning
studies were built around a continuation of the `youth revolution' of
that decade, the introduction of new lifestyles, tastes, and social
norms. In the 1970s many planning studies were premised around various
solutions and outcomes to the energy crisis. By then the youth movement
had been forgotten, just as in the 1980s the energy crisis had been
forgotten.
With the end of the cold war it is understandable that immediate
issues would be analyzed as future signposts. In the absence of other
guidance there is not much else on which to base planning. But if
anything seems certain it is that in not too many years a new
equilibrium in U.S. military spending will be established, the situation
in Bosnia will be accepted, and that new dangers will loom on the
nation's horizon.
Yet another aspect of change needs to be emphasized: the inability
of people who have been involved in a field for most of their careers to
preserve their capacity to be intellectually surprised. A tendency
exists in large organizations for members to see the world in terms of
an unsurprising repetition of bureaucratic turf grabs, interdepartmental
feuds, and self-serving individual behavior. Economist A.O. Hirschman
has written that in the field of Latin American economic development too
many experts have been unable to see the dramatic changes that have
taken place. Instead, they see an out-of-date world defined by
government incompetence, civil-military tensions, and technological
backwardness. While these exist, important transformations have occurred

in political and economic structures, capital markets, and civil control
of the military. If the U.S. Army must maintain one attitude, it is the
capacity to accept new ideas and patterns of thinking.
Cycles.
The Army can partly construct its future, but it also must accept
certain features of its external environment. Quite often the confluence
and superposition of these features of the environment defines the
future which actually occurs. For example, in the 1930s the Army found
itself in a world where
1) technology in the form of the internal
combustion engine created new opportunities for fundamental changes in
military strategy and tactics; 2) international relations among states
were turning to a more predatory structure with the rise of the
communist and fascist dictatorships; and 3) the industrial structure of
the United States was changing to permit dramatically new and increased
kinds of mobilization, as well as a newly skilled type of soldier who
could read, drive a truck, and follow complicated orders.
It is unlikely that had not all three of these developments
materialized, the nation would have achieved the success it did in World
War II. There is a tendency to want to reduce complex institutional
behavior to simple one-dimensional characterizations: "revolutionary
technology holds the answer to the future of war," or "without any
external threats there is no need for advanced strategic thinking." In
fact, something much more complicated takes place involving the
interaction of unrelated cycles of trend development. The job of
leadership in any institution is to examine the internal and external
organizational environments and decide what are the most important
cycles affecting them. Strategies must then be formulated to manage the
relationship of these, one to the other. The Army leadership in the
1930s had to think not just about the revolutionary implications of the
tank, but also of ways to mass produce tanks, train people to repair
them, and leverage off other parts of the enormous (relative to Germany
and Japan) U.S. industrial base to produce a congruent force structure
with a tooth-to-tail ratio that made sense.
With this perspective it is useful to consider `cycles' in key
technical and environmental areas. Cycles do not imply predictable
periodicity, but rather significant changes in underlying structures
that are in most respects unpredictable.

Technology. This probably receives more attention than any other
part of the Army's environment. The cold war against the Soviet Union
was fought as a virtual war through technological innovation designed to
deter military expansion and risk taking. A large technical in-house
community has been created. There is a strong tendency for institutional
momentum to continue to operate in this manner.
This is not the place for a technical forecast in the dynamic
fields of computers, communications, or information technology. Army
thinking in this area emphasizes the importance of information, and
especially of information dominance over an opponent.2 Whether this is
the right way to look at technology cycles is not clear, but experience
in the Gulf War and a perceived likelihood that the United States can
exploit such an advantage because of its capacities in computers and
telecommunications remains a powerful motivating force, one which, in
addition, looks to the future rather than the present.

A key question in this area is whether the current technological
defense community created to innovate during the cold war will remain
the best way to do so in the future. The Department of Defense is going
through the process of an `acquisition reform,' in which it is estimated
that somewhere between 35 - 40 percent overhead rates are attached to
the defense acquisition process. With declining defense budgets the
overhead costs which once were tolerable are no longer so.

Industrial Structure Changes. In the United States, the military
can only be as strong as the underlying economy. During World War II the
military gained leverage from the industrial economy. During the cold
war the Pentagon gained leverage from the strong technical base, both in
industry and academia. To the extent that a revolution in military
affairs is actually underway, the relationship between it and the rest
of the U.S. and world economies must be explored.
Here something of a paradox may be facing the United States.
Against a foe whose strategy and technology were well understood, the
Soviet Union, there could be clear objectives to optimize against. This
meant that a stable research and development infrastructure could be
supported and cultivated. This infrastructure contributed mightily to
containment of the Soviet Union. But in a different security environment
a new set of military-industry relationships must be forged.
Against a more nebulous set of objectives it is not at all clear
that the current R&D infrastructure is what is needed. With its large
in-house laboratory and arsenal system, and with a relationship to the
private sector that goes through specialized prime defense contractors,
the current system has an exorbitant set of overhead and transactions
costs associated with it. Thus, the present contracting budget climate
may present real opportunities to deconstruct and re-engineer the U.S.
defense industrial base.
Another way of putting it is that the budget environment may force
technological and industrial changes in the Army's relationship to the
larger civilian economy that would not otherwise be politically
feasible. Rather than decrying adverse impacts of reduced defense
expenditures, it may prove to be the case that the creative destruction
of these old relationships is a necessary precursor to full Army
participation in the revolution in military affairs. There is historical
precedent for this viewpoint. In the 1890s and early 1900s the United
States was a rising world power, and it took a supply and logistics
debacle in the Spanish American war to spur Congress to eliminate the
corrupt old bureau system of service supply.3 But what followed was not
so much designed from scratch as superior, as one which intrinsically
relied on new capacities of the American economy in administration,
professional management, and scale economies. The result was a system
that was by no means perfect, but which possessed an ability to respond
to large crises, something demonstrated in World War II.
What are some of the new trends in the American economy that could
bear on the Army's participation in a revolution in military affairs?
One of the most striking features is the increase in efficiency arising
from the appearance of tens of thousands of smaller firms, compared to
the Fortune 500, which are the incubators of technological innovation.
A tendency to think of the familiar giant corporate names as the engines
of the U.S. economy remains, but this view is a decade out of date. The

computer revolution has produced a wholesale restructuring of industrial
organization, whereby smaller firms have been able to capture economies
of scope as well as flexible economies of scale.4 This has produced a
move toward strong regional economies, places where these smaller firms
thrive for reasons of infrastructure availability, concentration of
technical personnel, and flexible relations among actors.5
In a related trend the main arena of technical innovation has
shifted to the commercial from the government sector. In the 1950s it
was the government, principally in DoD but also in other agencies like
NASA, that produced the early jet aircraft, computers, and materials
breakthroughs. It is now well appreciated that the U.S. Government is a
much smaller consumer of these than the private sector. However, it is
less well appreciated that the main source of innovation has shifted to
the private commercial sector. The U.S. Government, at least currently,
maintains a large collection of laboratories and research facilities
which it seeks to convert to other purposes. The existing defense
industrial base cannot keep up with the private market in producing
innovative solutions to problems. But the real question has less to do
with the proper disposal of the cold war defense industrial base and
everything to do with creating something new. Military planners are
confronted with the difficult issue of thinking about a new industrial
era, just as planners were in the early part of this century as they
confronted their industrial era. This is probably the area in which the
revolution in military affairs is in greatest need of thinking.
There are cycles in the relationship between public and private
sectors. At certain times government research leads the private sector,
and at other times it lags behind it. By all indications we are in a
period of private sector leadership, and this is the location of
innovation that all of the services must look to for the future. This
represents a cultural shift for the services which during the cold war
could rely on in-house research establishments to keep them supplied
with weapons, ideas, and innovations. A considerable change in outlook
will be needed for the Army and for the other services if they are to
relate to this different shape of the U.S. economy.
Associated with this trend is what in business schools is referred
to as true multinational companies, companies where national borders
represent little more than lines on a map. Companies like GE, Siemens,
Philips, and, increasingly, even Japanese firms, disperse their skills
and research around the globe. Old notions, such as the need to source
domestically, may be hard to change, but they are no longer meaningful
in today's global economy. As one example, the most advanced battery
research in the world doesn't take place in any one national facility.
Rather, it is dispersed in joint venture consortia with specialists from
many countries working together in Europe, Japan, and the United States,
sharing information among firms. For the U.S. government to try to beat
this with an in-house government laboratory, hampered by civil service
and acquisition rules, and not exposed to the competitive pressures of
the marketplace, is well nigh hopeless.
Organizing the mass of technical capability in today's world will
be very different than dealing with a handful of defense and industrial
giants as prime contractors. The services' entire approach to
acquisition will have to be changed, something which will include
standard notions of acquisition reform, but which will go far beyond
them. The essence of the problem is to open up the Army (and all of the

services) to these new industrial structures. Army people will have to
be expert on what is going on in the private sector in many different
areas, and can no longer become specialists in compliance to outdated
and
inefficient congressionally mandated purchasing rules. There are
several different ways to go about this, and a great deal of
experimentation will have to occur to reach a comfort level acceptable
to the Army. No one has the answer to these new relationships. But it
seems clear that there will be far more outsourcing of research and
development and that a new cadre of industrial specialties will have to
be created.
The reason for outsourcing research and development will not be to
save scarce dollars per se, but rather to revitalize existing
organizations by introducing new sources of information and new ways of
looking at problems. The Army will need to develop "architectural
knowledge teams"--in-house specialists who are experts in the latest
technical developments, but who understand that to get something done
they do not have to do it themselves in a government controlled
laboratory. Rather, they can save money, time and get a better result by
using the private sector. In a few years, the idea of posting Army
officers to commercial establishments will be routine, even though these
establishments seemingly have nothing directly to do with military
research or production. Strategic sourcing will be elevated to a much
higher status than it currently has, and a thorough overhaul of training
and education in the methods of strategic alliances, outsourcing, fluid
contracting, and preservation of architectural knowledge will be
necessary.
It may be useful in this respect to suggest a long-term Army issue
related to these industrial trends, but one which requires immediate
decisions. At the present time the Army is actively participating in a
congressionally mandated base realignment and closure (BRAC) review. The
way this is conceived is similar in all of the services: what they can
dispose of with least pain. What is not considered is what structure the
Army should move toward, rather than what it should move away from. The
Army should think through one of the trends mentioned above, the
emergence of regional economies built on innovation and attainment of a
critical mass of technical personnel. These private sector "sticky
regions"6 are very likely to be the "Ruhr Valleys" of the next century,
and the Army must consider ways to have some presence in them if they
are to harness the potential of the new industrial era to the revolution
in military affairs.

Strategic and International Trends. Whether classified as future
"threats" or as part of the emerging security environment, strategic and
international trends clearly have a profound impact on the Army as an
institution. Here an especially strong tendency exists to view current
problems as indicators of what the long-term future will hold. A tension
exists today between conceiving future conflicts as being variants of
the war against Iraq, or in terms of more likely contingencies which,
while quite different from one to the next, entail a more
politically-controlled use of force, emphasize special low-intensity
operations, and have as their goal the restoration of order in
disintegrating nations and states.
There can be little doubt that these latter contingencies,
exemplified by Somalia and Bosnia, are very likely to continue in other
parts of the world. The disintegration of the Soviet
empire and the

extraordinary momentum of Third World population growth promise no
shortage of crises. Rather than predicting where crises might occur it
is better to stipulate that they will occur somewhere, and that it is
not possible to consider them as lesser included cases of larger
regional military contingencies.
Although different perspectives exist about whether the United
States should build its military planning on threats of a regional
character (North Korea, Iraq, Iran, etc.) or so-called peace keeping
operations (Bosnia, Somalia), another kind of competitor now receives
only scant attention, with little more than a dismissal of it as a
possibility. This is a peer competitor in the sense of a major power
which could threaten the security of the United States by challenging us
in important parts of the world. Over the past 100 years we have faced
five such competitors: Britain in the last century, and then Imperial
Germany, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and Soviet Russia.
An issue that needs considerably more thought is how the collapse
of communism has created a situation where a replacement world ideology
of capitalism will change the structure of international relations.
While at first glance the triumph of capitalism seems like a victory for
the United States, a broader perspective is needed in thinking this
through. The question can be asked "Will a capitalist China, or India,
or Russia, or whatever, create more problems for the United States than
did their communist or socialists predecessors?"
An unwarranted
assumption is that capitalism means
democracy, and that because
democracies do not fight one another the United States will be a
long-term beneficiary of this trend. But the relationship between these
economic and political concepts is highly complex. The Soviet Union, in
fact, is the distinctive exception to the rule that America's previous
peer competitors had important aspects of capitalism associated with
their economic systems. Large private business enterprises dominated the
political landscape of Japan, Germany, and Britain when they were in
competition with the United States. This contributed to their dynamism.7
The issue could as easily be looked at another way: capitalism
means that once poor countries will become rich, and they will do so in
a way that uses modern technology supported by market allocations that
is likely to be more efficient than the Soviet Union was. Capitalism
does not equate with democracy, it only equates with private ownership
and use of markets. Indeed, the very gap between capitalism and
democracy has been the principal source of tension in modern Europe
since before World War II.
The world is now going through the greatest expansion of bringing
new people into the world marketplace than at any time in history.
Adding the populations of Russia, China, and India two billion people
once excluded from capitalism are now being thrust into it in a very
short time. When this transformation has occurred in other places it has
produced enormous upheavals. Consider the history of 19th and early 20th
century Europe when enormous class and national tensions were catalyzed
and manipulated for strategic ends and led to the disasters which took
place in Europe before 1945. There are no necessary reasons why this
should occur again, but there are reasons to take this trend as a good
one for constructing signposts about the character of America's
strategic future. The argument that the extension of capitalism to most
of Asia will produce comparable change to what its extension to Europe
did is at least as plausible as the argument that history is at an end

because of a consensus that liberal democracy is the best way to develop
in the future.
What are the signposts? Several different indicators might be
worth looking for. Change in the focus of Asian military institutions
from an inward to an outward orientation is one, a change that is
arguably taking place today.8 Were this to occur there would also follow
an evolution of strategic thought of a kind very different than what we
in the United States now think about. In terms of doctrine for employing
new military technologies, the United States today considers it
inconceivable than anyone could match us. The lesson of the cold war is
thought to be that the Soviet Union proved this point, for even they
could not compete against us. But the extent to which their economic
deficiencies contributed to their defeat suggests that other more
flexible economic actors could mount a different kind of challenge to
America. We would do well to recall the effects of very different
operational strategies employed by nations such as Japan in the 1890s,
Vietnam in the 1960s, and Germany in the 1930s, which all pursued their
objectives with different approaches than anticipated.
Finally, another signpost comes from what have been referred to as
B+ countries, that is, countries which start out as relatively minor B
league military actors, but who gradually learn how to operate modern
military forces in a way that while it does not turn them into peer
competitors with the United States does create military potential for
quick wins in regional conflicts. We have become used to thinking about
B powers as being unable to manage modern forces, and for the wars they
fought to be long duration battles of attrition. The Iran-Iraq war has
come to symbolize for many people what their military capacities allow
them to do: get many people killed through high level strategic
incompetence,
wherein
each
side
proves
incapable
of
decisive
breakthrough attacks--thus an absence of quick wins in Third World
conflicts.9
This has characterized such conflicts in the past two decades. But
it may not do so in the future. It would be dangerous indeed to assume
that all Third World countries are incapable of learning how to operate
modern forces. American industry once made the mistake of assuming that
Japanese, and later Korean, industry could not manage the modern
commercial enterprise. No one in American business believes this any
longer. The Korean economic miracle, and the current Chinese economic
miracle take place with an absence of democracy in Korea of a kind we
think of, and not at all in the case of contemporary China. If
industrialization can cross borders regardless of political systems, so
too can military modernization.
The first developing country which
can
master
minimal
improvements in national command and control of their armed forces will
obtain a tremendous military advantage over its neighbors. To the extent
this change is also accompanied by acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction--nuclear, biological, and chemical--an overnight change in
regional stability will take place. It is not that there will actually
be an overnight change in military capacities. Rather, it will appear
that way to the world, and especially to the countries in the affected
region because it is so unexpected. It will be extremely important for
the Army to monitor these changes and to develop signposts so that it is
not surprised as an institution.

The evolution of B to B+ countries is not something that is part
of the long distance future. It is a development with near and immediate
prospects. Many countries are studying the lessons of DESERT STORM, not
just the United States. Not all will be able to draw the appropriate
lessons, and not all will be able to execute needed changes even if they
are properly recognized. There will most likely be a differential
adaptation, as there is in any competitive situation, with great
benefits to the first mover. With the present distribution of world
power there will be great pressure on the United States to take the lead
in dealing with such a problem, and this pressure would be a reversal
from the one which sees a declining use for military power. For the Army
this means that for several years there may be little support for seeing
the world in terms of rising dangerous threats. But this could change to
a sharp reversal in national and international attitudes. The Army would
have to deal with these kinds of ups and downs in national policy, but
realistically this may be a part of the Army's environment.
Although it gets into immediate particulars, the case of North
Korea's nuclear weapons and her additional military power illustrates
one of the dynamics that shapes the Army external environment. For the
first years after the collapse of Soviet power it was widely argued that
economic power had become more important than military power. This is
still widely argued both in the United States and elsewhere. Yet North
Korea with less than 15 kilos of plutonium and a few reworked SCUD
missiles is now profoundly reshaping the security landscape of Northeast
Asia. North Korea has one of the weakest economies in the world. Yet she
is being treated with circumspection and caution, sending a message to
many other states that expansion of military capacities, far from being
obsolete, is one of the best ways to generate increased international
status.
Synopsis and Conclusion.
The viewpoint offered in this paper deals with issues badly in
need of greater attention. Current conceptions of national security in
the United States have placed far too much attention on immediate
problems, which although large and important, are not necessarily the
ones which will dominate the future. More importantly, current problems
are poor signposts for what to expect and prepare for.
Clearly, Army thinkers need to dwell on the immediate world
of
base closings, peace keeping, and reduced force structure. The key is to
not think solely about these issues, but instead to create a forum for
attention to longer term issues. Two examples developed in this paper
illustrate that it would be quite incorrect to conclude that because an
issue is long term it does not require immediate attention. North Korea
was a B power which is quickly developing into a B+ regional military
force, one very likely armed with weapons of mass destruction. In the
United States itself, Army participation in the BRAC process is shaping
the long-term future of the Army relationship to the future U.S.
economy. Yet if experience is any guide, this issue is most likely being
conceived of in more narrow terms of compliance with procedures and as a
way to reduce short-term expenditures.
The Army has to become a learning organization, one which in
addition to its immediate national requirements must also seek new
frameworks and open a dialogue among its best officers with outside
sources of innovation and thinking. One avenue for increasing this type

of organizational learning is to encourage it in the formal parts of the
Army charged with this responsibility. New ideas need to be emphasized
at the U.S. Army War College, in the testing and simulation centers, and
in ways that Army senior leaders are comfortable with. Judged from a
distance the Army does not appear to be doing a bad job in these areas
already. If there is a need that an outsider can discern, it lies in
establishing an interlinkage between areas that are not usually thought
about as being related. Nothing is self-evident in the relationship of
cycles
in
technology,
industrial
structure,
and
strategic
and
international relations. Yet in the confluence of events in these three
separate areas lie real dangers--as well as real opportunities-- for the
Army.
If one conclusion can be drawn from this discussion, it is the
need to become better at learning--not just learning about the process
of war, but also about the changes in the industrial structure of the
United States and about new dangers to American security emerging in the
international system. It is not too soon to start thinking about how to
do this.
Notes:
1. Paul Bracken, "The Military After Next," Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 16, Autumn 1993, pp. 157-174.
2. In particular, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command has
held several seminars and meetings on this subject.
3. James L. Abrahamson, America Arms for a New Century, New York:
Free Press, 1981.
4. John Case, From the Ground Up: The Resurgence of American
Entrepreneurship, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.
5.
See
Charles
Sabel,
"Flexible
Specialization
and
the
Re-Emergence of Regional Economies," in P. Hirst and J. Zeitlan, eds.,
Reversing Industrial Decline, Oxford, U.K.: Berg, 1988.
6. This term is used to characterize regional economies like
Silicon Valley, Baden-Wurtenburg in Germany, and Kakamigahara in Japan.
See also the description of technological development in Utah as a
"sticky region," in "Software Valley," Economist, April 23, 1994, pp.
69-70.
7. See Clive A. Trebilcock, "British Armaments and European
Industrialization, 1890-1914," Economic History Review, Vol. 26, 1973,
pp. 254-272;
Michael Mann, States, War and Capitalism, Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1988; and Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence,
Oxford: Polity Press, 1985, for different expressions of this argument.
8. Paul Bracken, "The Military Crisis of the Nation State: Will
Asia be Different From Europe?" British Political Studies, forthcoming
1995.
9. Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of
Modern War II: The Iran-Iraq War, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR REVOLUTION, EVOLUTION, AND
CONTINUITY IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
Raoul Henri Alcala
INTRODUCTION

Whither is the revolution in military affairs going?
This essay focuses on the nexus between ideas and actions. It
explores how concepts and doctrine shape three major areas of military
affairs that define military power: the design of forces including
organizations and materiel, the preparation of forces for war including
training and leader development, and the allocation of national
resources to provide for current and future forces. The author's basic
premise is that principles--acknowledged or tacit--guide action.
Moreover, widely held coherent collections of principles, that is,
doctrines, guide classes of actions in these three areas of military
affairs.
Today's actions and processes will have a significant effect on
the shape of the next generation of military forces, perhaps in the
second decade of the 21st century. This essay begins with a general
assessment of contemporary aspects of military affairs that have
particular significance for the future.
A prominent contemporary example of the primacy of doctrine is the
Army's AirLand Battle. Conceptualized in 1976,1 it was a seminal element
of the renaissance--perhaps future historians will consider it a
revolution--experienced by the U.S. Army following the war in Vietnam.2
It was formally promulgated in 1982. The principles embodied in the
doctrine have unambiguously guided the Army's preparation of forces to
deal with present and projected missions, roles, and functions. For
almost two decades, AirLand Battle has shaped the design of the Army's
forces; the preparation of Army forces for operations in peace and war;
and, to a significant extent, the allocation of scarce Army resources
among the various claimants. AirLand Battle doctrine has been the
bedrock upon which the Army built every aspect of its professional
being.

AirLand Battle doctrine evolved through the years that witnessed
the end of the cold war, and combat and peacetime operations from
Grenada and Panama to the Persian Gulf and Somalia. This evolution was
itself the product of a process that permitted maintaining continuity in
areas that were adequately addressed in the doctrine while changing it
to incorporate lessons learned from a variety of sources, domestic and
foreign. The 1993 publication of FM 100-5, Operations,3 began the
projection of this doctrine from the rapidly changing post-cold war
environment into an uncertain and challenging future.
The example of FM 100-5 has relevance for what has been dubbed the
"revolution in military affairs" that today is shaping tomorrow's
American military capabilities. This is not to say that without change
the latest iteration of FM 100-5 is the answer to all--or any--of the
unforeseeable circumstances ahead. Rather, the primacy of ideas that is
the essential lesson of FM 100-5 is likely to continue to dominate
military affairs for the foreseeable future.

Following the Army's lead by 20 years, the other services have now
established their own doctrine commands. At the interservice level,
joint doctrine development is moving forward at an unprecedented pace.
As stated in the new Joint Pub 1:
Military leaders understand the nature and utility of
doctrine. Military doctrine presents fundamental principles
that guide the employment of forces.... Joint doctrine offers
a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and
fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for
war.4
<pre>
General Colin L. Powell, USA, CJCS, 1991
</pre>
Although it is premature to conclude that joint doctrine shapes
the way the services think about and prepare their forces for war, it is
indisputable that joint doctrine shapes the way the combatant commands
prepare for operations and train their assigned forces for those
operations.
While technology races ahead at a dizzying and apparently ever
increasing pace, and world events unfold in ways that challenge our
imaginations and shatter our preconceptions, it is organized ideas
including military doctrine that dominate and rationalize the processes
by which the U. S. military services conceive of and shape future
military capabilities. As the United States develops new ways of war,
moving into perhaps a new revolution in military affairs, doctrine will
surely be a key constituent.
Current doctrine and new concepts for developing future doctrine
(abbreviated as "futures concepts" in the remainder of this essay) play
a central role in the paradigms that provide the framework for analysis
of future force options. Two elements that define the paradigm are the
projections of the future circumstances in which military force will be
needed, and the manner of determining which military force capabilities
will be needed to assure success.
Contemporary Projections of Alternative Futures.
Conceptualizing the future entails the projection of trends and
the selection of a manageable number of circumstances-- scenarios--from
a larger set of possible alternatives. The cold war in the past
simplified this task. The increasing uncertainties and instabilities
evident in the international environment since the end of the cold war
are at least as challenging as those the United States experienced in
the last major revolution in military affairs, at the advent of the
Selecting planning scenarios from the set of plausible
nuclear age.5
alternatives is now a relatively more difficult task. Nevertheless, to
continue to provide adequate guidance for the development of future
military capabilities, doctrine and futures concepts must accommodate an
appropriate set of alternative futures.
Today's perceptions are catalysts and at the same time present
obstacles in choosing alternative futures. For instance, the speed and
relative ease with which U. S. forces executed DESERT STORM have
produced claims of a new way of war6 and expectations about similar
successes in future combat situations.7
To be sure, the focus on new
realities helps us shed irrelevant residues of the past. The Clinton

administration and its "Bottom-Up Review"8 ushered in the latest
reassessment of strategy, forces, and resources. It emphasized the new
circumstances created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, substituting
a set of regional conflict scenarios for the East-West conflict
scenarios of the past.9 However, the planning horizon for the Bottom-Up
Review and the scenarios it employed are limited to the near term, not
projecting beyond the end of the decade. There is no new set of
longer-range scenarios that would be appropriate for the Defense
Department, the Joint Staff, and the services to use for future force
development.
In stressing the latest realities, the new conventional wisdom
also simultaneously makes it is increasingly difficult to see what has
not changed. Military organizations under continuous threat of
employment cannot afford the discontinuity that would result from taking
time out to reshape themselves as they experiment with and eventually
adopt new doctrines, organizations, and equipment. Armed forces in
today's circumstances must maintain continuity of capability while they
simultaneously prepare for the future.
The process of conceptual and doctrinal change, therefore, should
incorporate today's range of plausible futures, as the Bottom-Up Review
does, as well as other scenarios that provide insurance against futures
that today appear to be unlikely or possibly even implausible. The
process must be flexible, allow for reassessments and periodic
corrections, so that future forces may be capable and versatile enough
to cope with the unexpected.
Should Threats or Capabilities Guide Force Development?
Developing tomorrow's forces calls for a major change in the cold
war force development paradigm. The point estimates of future Soviet
developments and the accompanying threat-based analyses of the past are
no longer relevant. Rather, the new paradigm should focus on developing
needed capabilities for use in challenging but uncertain future
environments.10
Therefore, the new paradigm calls for new measures of
merit, not based entirely on the "force-on-force" algorithms of the
past. The new measures of merit that apply to the future should include
the efficiency, effectiveness, and interoperability of the new
capabilities contemplated.
Efficiency relates to the resources (funds, time, people) needed
to produce a particular capability. Effectiveness relates to the ability
(range, probability of kill, survivability of combatants and their
equipment) to produce the needed effect or end state. Interoperability
relates
to
the
ability
to
exercise
the
capability,
even
extemporaneously,11 in a joint and combined force. The baseline for
comparison becomes our own current capability rather than a presumed or
projected "threat" force's capability. Because these new measures are in
themselves valuable and can be quantified, in time they should be widely
accepted, even by the adherents of the obsolete threat-based force
development paradigm.
In a fundamental sense, a paradigm that focuses on making U. S.
forces as good as they can be, as survivable as they can be, evokes
values that are at the core of American culture. Such a calculus also
makes the future of the volunteer force more secure. Rather than
enlisting in a force whose capabilities and size are just good enough

theoretically to beat the current world villain, the high quality youth
needed for all our services would arguably be more attracted by a force
that is demonstrably superior and challenges them to be all that they
can be. There is substance for the future behind the time-honored Army
advertising slogan.12
The
transition
of
the
force
development
paradigm,
from
threat-based to capabilities-based, will have major effects on the
development of doctrine and futures concepts. In the Army's case, the
basic assessments of the sufficiency of current doctrine and the force
capabilities it shapes will shift from defeat of the presumed threat to
meeting the new measures of merit. Rather than focusing on "battlefield
deficiencies," assessments and analyses will shift more to identifying
opportunities for more efficient, effective, and interoperable ways of
conducting operations.
Fielding Future Forces.
The end of the cold war and the dissolution of the Soviet Empire
have produced an understandable but dangerous trend. Stripped of their
principal former adversary, the armed forces have begun a rapid decline
in size and capability. Measured against the remaining contemporary bad
actors, even much smaller forces appear to be adequate. Nevertheless, it
takes much longer to reconstitute or create new forces than it does to
inactivate them. If there is a relevant lesson in our past on this
matter it is that we have uniformly appreciated new threats too late.
The processes we set in place to guide the transition to the future,
including developing new doctrine and futures concepts, should heed this
lesson.
Even small forces need the field laboratories in which to
experiment with alternative future capabilities. Moreover, innovations
that involve changes in doctrine, organization designs, and training
cannot be developed in theory and put on the shelf in the way that a
more efficient engine or longer-life battery possibly can be. Therefore,
the full spectrum of combat development activities, from thinkers
through the most sophisticated computer simulations to the ultimate
tests with units in the field, should remain in place regardless of the
reduction in the overall force size.
In planning today for fielding tomorrow's forces, it is therefore
vital to provide for the time needed to effect a transition to different
types of forces or larger force structures. It is similarly vital to be
certain of the capabilities the new forces will have before beginning
the process of replacing the old forces. In large, complex, and highly
interdependent organizations such as land combat units, high confidence
based on solid field testing is essential.
Assessing the Future.
In assessing the ongoing revolution in military affairs, this
essay will concentrate on the processes by which ideas guide actions,
against the background of the development paradigm and planning
considerations outlined in this introduction. It will examine how
concepts and doctrine can properly shape future U.S. military
capabilities in the three major areas of force design, training and
leader development, and resource allocation.

The point of departure is a review of the three services'
operating environments. These environments provide the context within
which service professionals (officers and noncommissioned officers)
develop their mindsets and learn to define their unique expertise.
Doctrine and futures concepts in each of the services respect the biases
that the operational environments produce.
The second element in the assessment is a review of the
characteristics of the three major areas and how concepts and doctrine
influence them. Of special importance is the inclusion of defense
agencies that provide capabilities for the entire defense establishment
and are controlled directly by the Defense Department, not by the
individual services or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The final section summarizes and offers thoughts on the process by
which the principles that guide action in military affairs are
developed. It offers a perspective on the limits of revolution,
evolution, and continuity in military affairs.
UNIQUE SERVICE ENVIRONMENTS
The environments within which the combat elements of each of the
services operate are the major socializing influences on their members,
particularly their career professionals. The dominant characteristics of
air, land, and sea combat environments are significantly different from
each other.
The environments described in this essay are based on the author's
assessment of how combat against regional adversaries would be conducted
in the period extending from the present to the 2020s. In the past,
during the height of the cold war, the risk levels for all services'
combat forces were admittedly higher. The descriptions of each
environment include, where applicable, the implications of these risk
differentials.
Air Combat Environment.
The air combat environment described in this section is for
fixed-wing aircraft. The operational environment in which combat
(attack, rescue, reconnaissance) helicopter units operate is essentially
the same as the land combat environment and is therefore included there.
Combat aircraft and their crews are in harm's way for relatively
short periods of time. Limitations of the aircraft themselves and the
nature of air-to-air and air-to-ground combat define this environment
and its short employment periods. Air combat units and their crews are
launched from and recover to relatively protected and comfortable areas.
The central process that directs air forces' employment in most
types of operations is the air tasking order (ATO). While the more
comprehensive joint campaign plan and force component plans and orders
establish the specific missions and desired end states over time, the
ATO is the central driving process that dominates air crews' lives. The
ATO ensures the sustainment over time of the principal air functions
which include: attack of point or area targets on land, control of
aerospace from aircraft, protection of the aircraft aloft with other
aircraft aloft, and reconnaissance over land areas.

This repetitive cycle of intense risk and relative comfort is
likely to be the dominant characteristic of air crew combat environments
for the foreseeable future. In addition, the limitations on air
functions imposed by periods of extreme weather and restricted
visibility on land--which limit further the periods of intense risk for
air crews--are also likely to continue to moderate the air crew combat
environment for some time.
During the cold war, the Soviet adversary possessed roughly
equivalent conventional air combat capabilities, significantly larger
air forces, formidable air defense forces, and a very high nuclear
capability. For American air combat crews, the risks during air
operations were significantly higher than they are against any current
or foreseeable regional foe. During the cold war, the nuclear threat was
high at main operating bases. Projecting ahead, the main threat against
operating bases is from weapons of mass destruction (chemical and
biological, primarily) that may be delivered by aircraft, ballistic
missiles, and cruise missiles. While these current risks are certainly
not negligible, they are significantly lower than the risk levels during
the cold war for air combat crews in operations and during periods of
rest and recovery.
Land Combat Environment.
In contrast to the air crew combat environment, armies must place
their combat soldiers continuously in harm's way, most often directly in
contact or in imminent probability of contact with a lethal adversary.
The operational environment of amphibious (or "marine" infantry) forces
is essentially identical to armies once the force is projected ashore.
In peacetime, the training environments of army and marine land combat
units are essentially identical.
Land combat forces engage in continuous operations to attack and
destroy forces and facilities, to control territory, and to protect
friendly areas and their populations; while ensuring their own survival
and freedom of action. Continuous and often high risk from enemy action
characterizes the daily existence of combat soldiers. Maintaining combat
capability during operations, and the versatility to adapt it to the
exigencies and opportunities of the situation without interruption,
comprise the central operational process for which the ATO is the
equivalent for air combat crews.
Once engaged, land combat units normally maintain contact to
assure battlefield dominance through control of information and
maneuver. They break contact only in extreme circumstances. Crew rest is
organized in a staggered fashion to permit continuous operations, day
and night, regardless of the weather. While risk is reduced during rest
periods, it remains continuously high in contrast to the relatively risk
free areas which air combat crews occupy between their periods of combat
engagement. For prolonged operations, land combat units are rotated to
secure areas for short periods of more comfortable and risk-free rest,
recuperation, and force reconstitution.
As in the case of air combat crews, the risks associated with the
cold war were higher for land combat forces. However, the relatively
high risk in combat against plausible foes does not significantly change
the combat operational environment for land combat. Moreover, the
vulnerability of land combat formations to weapons of mass destruction

even from relatively primitive adversaries is significantly higher than
that experienced by air or naval combat units.
Sea Combat Environment.
Naval forces operate in a combat environment that lies between the
operational environments of air and land combat forces. Sea combat units
are, typically, in harm's way for relatively short periods of time. The
naval force functions include destruction of targets at sea and on land,
control of selected sea areas, and facilitating and protecting force
deployments by sea and projection of those forces onto land for combat
or other operations.
Air combat units that operate from aircraft carriers experience
essentially the same operating environment as do air combat crews.
Submarine combat units, while more isolated for longer periods of time
than many surface combat units, are now operating in an environment of
low risk which is likely to continue well into the next century.
During the cold war, naval forces of all types experienced much
higher risk levels than they do now against plausible adversaries. Among
the services, sea combat units have experienced the most significant
reduction in the risks associated with their operational environments as
a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The "Bureau" Environment.
Rather than being a facetious consideration, the operating
environment of the numerous "bureaus" in the defense establishment
merits consideration as a separate category. Much of the combat power of
the U.S. Armed Forces is based on organizations that never deploy to any
battlefield, never experience air or sea combat, and indeed are never
really at risk from the adversary. Excluded from this category are the
thousands of civilians who work directly for U.S. Government entities or
contractors and who routinely deploy with uniformed combat units to
operational theaters. This later set of individuals shares exactly the
risks of the forces they support.
The denizens of the bureaus have a "combat" environment that is
dominated by two types of "actions." One is the numerical analyses of
budgetary data. The other is the analysis of an item or program against
qualitative criteria, including such sources as presidential campaign
promises and local congressional interests. Literate, interpersonal, and
cerebral skills are most relevant in this environment. Quantifiable
dimensions of analysis are particularly prized.
The bureaus have essentially no characteristics in common with the
operating environments that shape the uniformed professionals. It is not
by accident that uniformed professionals so often shun service in the
bureaus. Neither is it by accident that bureau denizens often have a
difficult
time
appreciating
the
implications
of
essentially
unquantifiable aspects of combat operational environments. The author
recognizes that many bureaucrats have had substantial military service
in combat units; and that many combat veterans occupy at least temporary
positions in bureaus. It would be inaccurate to overstate the limiting
effects on the products of the bureaus--policies and budgets in the
main--as a consequence. Nevertheless, these different environments do
make a difference in the acculturation of civilian and military

professionals in the American defense establishment, and these
differences should be taken into account in assessing substantive
matters that bring civilians and the military together as they do in
every aspect of the revolution in military affairs that many assert is
underway.
Basic Implications of Unique Service Environments.
Understanding the operational environments is key to understanding
the service cultures, the military values of their professionals, and
therefore the ways in which they develop their doctrines and futures
concepts. It is important to acknowledge that there is no "joint"
operational environment. Deployed headquarters share, in the main, the
operational environments of air or sea combat units. Those headquarters
in the United States share the bureau environment.
The admirable initiatives to expand each service professional in
progressive and sequential joint education and operational experiences
have not changed service cultures. These joint episodes certainly serve
to expand mutual understanding but they in themselves cannot affect the
operational environments of each service's combat units and therefore
cannot change the dominant nature of their cultural influence.
ASSESSMENT OF MAJOR DEFENSE AREAS
In assessing the nexus of ideas and actions in the major areas of
military affairs, the author has implicitly based his judgments on the
principles outlined in the introduction to this essay in light of the
unique environments that shape professional attitudes across the
American defense establishment. The starting point is a brief review of
the status of joint and service doctrine and futures concepts efforts.
Service and Joint Doctrine.
In the seventh year following enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols
Act,13 there has been considerable progress in developing doctrine to
guide joint military action, although a substantial amount of work
remains. Authoritative joint publications have been promulgated for 51
of the 100 subject areas selected for joint doctrine development. Of the
remainder, in 43 areas a publication is under development. In only six
areas is there nothing under development.14
There are joint manuals to guide the armed forces at the highest
levels of all major functional areas except plans, for which a manual is
under development (Joint Pub 5-0, Plans).15 The areas in which doctrine
development has not begun include:
• Interagency Coordination (Joint Pub 1-06),
• Employment of Selected Weapon Systems (Joint Pub 1-09),
• Counterair Operations (Joint Pub 3-01),
• Joint Engagement Zone (Joint Pub 3-01.6),
• Humanitarian Assistance (Joint Pub 3-07.52), and
• Domestic Support Operations (Joint Pub 3-07.53).

In these six areas, progress has been frustrated by a combination
of insufficient agreement on fundamental principles, insufficient time,
and higher priority doctrine development projects for the Joint Staff,
services, and combatant commands concerned. In one area, previously set
aside16 as the domain of "basic national defense doctrine," early drafts
proved inadequate and there has been no further progress.
In all, in spite of obvious progress, there is no joint
publication that harmonizes all major functional areas in the way that
FM 100-5 and AFM 1-117 provide the doctrinal capstones for the Army and
Air Force, respectively. Each joint publication has had unique guidance
without the benefit of an overarching doctrinal concept. A variety of
entities, principally the services and combatant commands, have been
responsible for developing the initial drafts. As a consequence, even
after all 100 joint manuals now planned have been completed, they will
have to be harmonized within and between functional areas. Moreover,
whereas the Army's system specifically guides force development, the
joint system does not.
To illustrate the difference between the authority vested in Army
and joint doctrine, below are the operative statements from the Army's
latest version of FM 100-5 and the latest of the major functional area
manuals in the joint system.
FM
100-5
furnishes
the
authoritative
foundation
for
subordinate doctrine, force design, material acquisition,
professional education, and individual and unit training. 18
Joint Pub 2-0 is the keystone document of the joint
intelligence series. This publication sets forth doctrine to
govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed
Forces of the United States in joint operations as well as
the doctrinal basis
for
US
military
involvement
in
multinational
and
interagency
operations.
It
provides
military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant
commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes
doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides
military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing
their appropriate plans.... In applying the doctrine set
forth in this publication, care must be taken to distinguish
between distinct but related responsibilities in the two
channels of authority to forces assigned to combatant
commands. The Military
Departments and Services recruit,
organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to
combatant commands....19
The Army's guidance is clear and direct. Joint doctrine, on the
other hand, neither directly nor through the combatant commanders has
the status to guide the fundamental activities reserved to the services
under Title 10, United States Code. The implications of this difference
will be outlined in the discussion of force development.
It is important to acknowledge the impact of lessons learned,
particularly from the Persian Gulf War, on doctrine. In the immediate
aftermath of the war, motivated by the desire to attenuate service
differences and to begin to provide top-down doctrinal guidance, General
Colin L. Powell commissioned (and to a significant extent personally

wrote) a wholly new publication, Joint
Warfare of the U. S. Armed
Forces.20 Stressing the imperatives of joint action, it advertised on
its front cover that, "Joint Warfare is Team Warfare."
This manual
sought to give impetus to a post-war spirit of interservice cooperation,
to energize all concerned to eliminate the large joint doctrine
development backlog, and to incorporate as rapidly as possible the
lessons of DESERT STORM.21
A formal Defense Department report on the
conduct of the Gulf War contained many useful findings and lessons.22
Not to be left without comment on this matter, the then Chairman of the
House Armed Services Committee commissioned and published his own report
on the war.23 Taken together, the Defense Department and congressional
reports contain findings and observations that are useful input for
joint and service doctrine and futures concepts development. Standing
alone, however, neither report adds anything significant to the existing
body of guiding principles that determine the military power of the
United States.
For its part, the Army incorporated lessons learned from DESERT
STORM with its ongoing futures concepts process to produce the 1993
edition of FM 100-5, Operations.24 This edition of the manual included
significant aspects of the previous Army futures concept, Airland
The Army also completed a one-volume assessment of
Operations.25
lessons learned in all areas, including doctrine, publishing the result
in 1993.26
The Army Chief of Staff promulgated a general vision
statement to guide the development of doctrine and other future-oriented
activities, also in 1993.27
The Air Force published a White Paper, Global Reach--Global
and a new edition of its capstone manual, Air Force Manual
Power,28
1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force.29 It also
commissioned an extensive "Gulf War Air Power Survey" that presented its
The Air Force sought to give
findings and recommendations in 1993.30
doctrine development additional emphasis by upgrading its activity to a
Doctrine Command, although its commander remains a colonel. The Navy
seized the opportunity presented in the aftermath of the Gulf War to
emphasize its role in projecting power (including armies and naval
infantry) ashore. The Navy's concept was published in a White Paper
entitled From the Sea.31
The Navy also established its own Doctrine
Command. In contrast to the Army's long established doctrine and futures
concepts development process, and its comprehensive Training and
Doctrine Command, the Air Force and Navy efforts in these directions are
embryonic. In due course, they will mature and acquire reputations based
on the value their respective services accord to their products.
Service and Joint Futures Concepts.
The Army has a well-established process for developing futures
concepts. These concepts provide for a disciplined exploration of
alternative futures to permit development of doctrine for the future.
This process resulted in the revisions to FM 100-5 promulgated in 198632
and 1993. At present, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command is
completing work on the latest such futures concept which will be
promulgated in a new TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5. When approved,33 this
pamphlet will become the authoritative basis for projecting ahead all
the Army shaping activities, including doctrine; operational concepts
for organizations and major weapon systems; the design of organizations;
materiel; and training and leader development programs. The new futures
concept will also influence the overall allocation of resources for

other future development activities.
Among the services, the Army's doctrine and futures concepts
development system is the most comprehensive and mature.34 Neither the
other services nor the joint doctrine system have concepts in place to
explore alternative futures. The joint doctrine system has no provision
for such developments. Moreover, there is no process or product in the
Defense Department to provide guidance or direction from the level of
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on futures concepts.
Two current initiatives within OSD and the Joint Staff could in
the future provide policy and doctrinal guidance for futures concepts
and future doctrine. One is sponsored by the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. It seeks to revitalize the
long-range planning system and provide general guidance to the uniformed
military establishment and the service secretariats for completing the
transition to capabilities-based force planning and for improving the
integration of defense-wide planning activities. This initiative could
provide policy direction for a joint process of futures concepts
development to include the selection of a relevant family of planning
scenarios that go beyond those contained in the Bottom-Up Review.35 The
most recent Defense Department Annual Report acknowledges that: "The
requirements process must be more closely integrated with the
operational concepts and objectives."36 This planning initiative could
be helpful in this regard.
The second initiative is being undertaken within the Joint Staff
under the auspices of the Vice Chairman. It entails revising the terms
of reference for the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to
improve the way in which it can influence the definition of military
requirements for materiel systems as well as other dimensions of
military capability. Under the JROC's current mandate, it has the
responsibility
for
articulating
military
needs
and
validating
performance goals and program baselines for consideration by the Defense
Acquisition Board (DAB).37
In view of the JROC's position atop the
uniformed military requirements process and its role in advising the
DAB, if the OSD policy planning and JROC mandate revision processes are
synchronized, these combined initiatives could give impetus to a proper
joint futures concepts development process that could, in turn, shape
future joint force development. At present, however, because of the
absence of futures concepts development systems outside the Army, there
is no capstone vision statement for future development except in the
Army.
As an indicator of the emphasis given to doctrine and its
development, it is revealing that in the DOD Annual Report, only the
Army and Air Force commented at all on this subject. Neither the DOD nor
Navy sections of the report has any reference to doctrine. The Army
asserted the importance of the new FM 100-5:
The Army recently revised the intellectual foundation for its
operations. We published a new FM 100-5, Operations, both to
accommodate
new
strategic
realities
and
to
ensure
continuity.38
The Air Force asserted that:
Our doctrinal contribution to the ever-developing role of

aerospace power in recent joint operations is also important.
For example, in theater air defense, we are studying the
evolving aircraft, cruise missile, and ballistic missile
threats....39
These comments reveal, as well, the context in which these two
services typically view doctrine. The Army sees doctrine as a coherent
set of broad guidelines that reach out to all aspects of the its
operations. The Air Force at times views doctrine as an instrument for
achieving specific purposes in specific functional areas, as well as
asserting in the most general terms the role of "aerospace power" in
military affairs.40
Doctrine will have to be a central feature in any revolution in
military affairs. A significant obstacle to such a revolution is the
lack of any overarching OSD or joint vision statement or guidance for
futures concepts. The discussion of force development will highlight the
negative consequences that this creates for future force planning.
Service and Joint Force Development Processes.
Force development, as the term is used in this essay, comprises
the design of organizations and materiel to accomplish combat and
peacetime tasks. It is the function that creates the military potential
needed to carry out the tasks. By contrast, training and leader
development convert that potential into actual military capabilities.
Doctrine and futures concepts provide the sets of principles that
guide the force development process. They distill and interpret the
lessons of the past. They accommodate the central values and mores of
national culture and the unique aspects of the services' operating
environments. Futures concepts, in particular, posit alternatives for
the future that merit detailed analysis and experimentation.
In the process of force development, doctrine and technology
interact. Technology developed without the benefit of doctrine may serve
no useful military purpose. Doctrine established without understanding
the promise and limitations of technology cannot accomplish its
principal purpose. The issue is not which comes first, but how they
should relate to each other.
At this point in the post-cold war period, force development and
the absolute size of the armed forces are, so to speak, under siege. It
is difficult for the defense establishment to be persuasive about needed
new capabilities with the Soviet threat gone. Similarly, the defense
structure and its funding have become the principal source of resources
in Government-wide budget and deficit reduction initiatives and
"reinvestment" programs. Development of future forces under these
circumstances encounters obstacles that are the most severe that they
have been since the end of World War II.
It is, of course, entirely appropriate to insist that the
proponents of new capabilities make their case. It is also obviously
essential to assure the vitality of the American economy now and for the
future. Nevertheless, while reducing defense budgets and downsizing and
reshaping forces are essential, there is a lesson concerning the size
and composition of the armed forces that should be appreciated when
contemplating future force development. In this tumultuous period of

global instability and uncertainty, it is especially important for the
U.S. Armed Forces to have a robust capability to cope with unanticipated
but definable challenges in combat and noncombat situations.
Individual units must be versatile enough to adapt to a range of
potential types of employment against a wide variety of adversaries-including a potential peer competitor at some point in the next century.
Forces developed for the challenging period ahead cannot be expected to
succeed if they are designed as lean organizations specialized to
perform a single task or a small set of tasks against a small and
defined set of potential adversaries. Forces in being today were
designed during the height of the cold war. Because their organizational
designs and materiel were inherently robust and versatile, they can with
little difficulty adapt to post-cold war challenges. Operation DESERT
STORM provides the most obvious evidence.
In assessing current force development efforts, two "lessons" from
the Persian Gulf War and more recent exercises have seminal importance.
These are the lessons of precision in the attack of distant targets on
land, and of simultaneous operations throughout the battle area.
In the area of precision, some of the lessons are almost too
obvious. If a target can be located, it can be destroyed at relatively
low risk to our own attack forces with a very high level of confidence.
Attack means include manned aircraft and stand-off missiles launched
from land, sea, or airborne platforms. The probabilities are very high
for penetrating enemy defenses, definitively locating a previously
identified target, delivering the lethal or nonlethal "warhead" where
and when it is needed, achieving the desired end state (destruction,
suppression, immobilization), and recovering the attacking force with
little or no damage or casualties.
Not as obvious in the lessons of precision attack are three major
unresolved issues. These are the nature and location of the real
intended target, the timing of the attack, and limiting unwanted
"collateral" damage.
Not all targets are what they appear. Some prime targets are not
obvious, not easy to distinguish from areas of little or no value. It
remains much easier to hit what can be seen than it is to be sure what
it is that is seen or actually has been hit.
Even if the target is indeed what it appears to be, it matters
when it is attacked. Some targets have values that vary over time.
Destroying an empty building may be useful but not as useful as
destroying it and the function it performs when that best assists our
forces to achieve important objectives. The destruction of some targets
will only have the desired effect within relatively narrow time limits.
At this point in service and joint force development, we have perfected
neither a method for determining the optimal time for attack nor the
mechanisms to utilize fully all available capabilities of all services
and allies at that time.
The issue of unwanted collateral damage continues to be serious in
spite of the significant increases in accuracy of many of our latest
warheads. As a consequence, the relative efficiency of long-range
stand-off attack may be inappropriate in important cases, possibly
necessitating foregoing the attack altogether. The cases of aircraft

placed next to archaeological monuments and difficulties of destroying
objects such as bridges located in populated areas are illustrative.
These three issues are likely to characterize the precision attack
task for the foreseeable future and, therefore, should be taken into
account by future force development initiatives.
In the area of simultaneous operations, it is now possible to
operate in depth to attack key combat functions and their control and
support means in a way that can achieve the end state without the need
for a prolonged sequence of close operations. When combined with the
effects of precision, simultaneity can substantially shorten the length
and costs associated with campaigns on land, facilitating an early and
favorable conclusion of hostilities.
The major issues concerning simultaneity appear to be controlling
information and intelligence, and synchronizing the operations of all
force providers. The major force development initiatives in the Army
center on the first of these issues. The Army is striving for near
perfect distributed situational awareness through the proliferation of
digital data processing capabilities in its principal combat platforms.
It is also seeking to ensure it has near perfect intelligence and
information provided to all who can use it in near real time, while
denying the same to the adversary and even actively deceiving the
adversary with false information. In both cases, the Army has in place
the basic doctrinal principles in the new FM 100-5 to begin to master
these two issues. It also is completing a new futures concept, as
mentioned above, to develop further these and other areas to achieve
"full-dimensional operations."41
These Army initiatives are typical of the force development
process. Each service has derived parochial lessons from combat against
Iraq. There is no joint mechanism to enforce a doctrinal basis for
moderating this normal but inefficient parochialism. Neither is there
joint future force development guidance that addresses these and other
basic questions of military affairs.
There is no guidance on the degree of robustness needed, much less
how to achieve it. Rather, there is ample guidance and forced budget
cuts on programs that originally were focused on the Soviet Union. The
exception to this rule is triggered when the civilian industrial base
appears in jeopardy, but not when combat functions could be at risk if
optimistic estimates of the future42 prove invalid. The operating
assumption is that "overlap" is unnecessary, except possibly in the case
of the nuclear triad.
Service operating environments are vital in developing guidance
for future force development. If future operations are assessed to be
essentially comprised of precise target attack and destruction or
neutralization (best rationalized in air and sea cultures), then the
other functions in war and peace will pay the bills. At the other
extreme, if future military operations are assessed as requiring largely
humanitarian and other assistance to civil authorities and peace keeping
operations, sophisticated air and sea precision attack forces become
irrelevant, as do forces that project combat power (rather than
noncombat assistance) from the sea.
Current

processes

and

guidance

provide

no

alternative

to

independent and uncoordinated service force development activities
moderated at the last stage in the development process by the DAB, JROC,
and political budget pressures. In technical fields there is, on the
other hand, perhaps too much detailed near-term technical development
guidance. Even a cursory review of the DOD Annual Report, the latest
congressional authorization and appropriation bills, and the latest OSD
program and budget guidance will adequately illustrate this conclusion.
For longer-term science and technology developments, after casting aside
the previous Administration's strategy and technology thrusts, the
current Administration has not yet developed a replacement.43
A disciplined long-range planning process that included a range of
plausible (even if currently improbable) scenarios, and guidance for
developing futures concepts and future doctrine, would be the first step
in the establishment of a long overdue joint force development process.
Service and Joint Training and Leader Development.
Service training is continuous, intense, and expensive. Joint
training is episodic and expensive. Neither service nor joint peacetime
training adequately prepares forces for future contingencies. At the
nexus of ideas and actions in this major area of military affairs are
doctrine, which is adequate, and funding priorities, which are
inappropriate.
Services typically approach joint training as a necessity to be
addressed after the fundamental service core competencies at individual
and unit levels have been achieved. In the Army, the mission essential
tasks that guide each unit typically ignore or inadequately stipulate
the requirements for integrating the unit into a joint or combined
formation. The notable exceptions, of course, are Army airborne units
and their habitually associated Air Force airlift units. Even in the
most sophisticated and intense training environments, the National
Training Center and the Battle Command Training Program in the Army's
case, joint dimensions such as air-ground integration are underdeveloped
and underutilized.
The traditional Defense Department budget and program practices
have left largely to the individual services the establishment of
training priorities and funding. The standard auditing mechanism
consists
of
self-reported
readiness
indicators
that
remain
service-specific. Absent are indicators of the achievement of joint
training objectives which can be derived from joint doctrine.
To be sure, the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act have
enabled joint commanders to establish readiness and capability
objectives for their assigned service forces. However, the services
control the allocation of the overwhelming majority of training funds
and determine training standards. There is no institutional, procedural
link between joint doctrine, joint command requirements, and allocation
of funds across and within services to support training.
Leader development is predominantly a service function, although
it also is affected by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Services correctly
view leader development as the most important function for ensuring
near-term success in combat and for properly shaping the forces of the
future. Leaders are the services' most important legacies from
generation to generation.

In their programs of formal leader education and training,
development
through
successive
operational
assignments,
and
encouragement of individual self-development, the services adopt
priorities that mirror their training priorities. The highest priority
is accorded to developing the basic service and specialty core
competencies. These basic leader development building blocks include
solid acculturation in the unique service operating environment. The
joint dimension of leader development becomes an added element, not an
inherent element, in leader development programs.
As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, much more intrusive
joint requirements are placed on the formal education and promotion
systems. Nevertheless, as in the case of joint training, the
preponderance of guidance and funding for leader development programs
rests with the services without overarching joint guidance. There are no
institutional, procedural links between joint doctrine, the substance of
leader development programs, and the amount and priority of funding for
the preponderance of the functions that remain within the services.
The major point in this assessment of the joint dimensions of
training and leader development programs is not that they should be
taken from the services. It is, rather, that the services should be
given better guidance to make these joint dimensions integral to leader
development and training rather than the thin veneer that they are
today. As simulations assume a greater proportion of training and leader
development programs, it may become easier to integrate joint
dimensions. However, without adequate joint guidance for futures
concepts and force development, this major area of military affairs will
continue to be underdeveloped. It will not produce the maximum joint
combat capability from the potential of all the services' unit designs
and materiel.
Service, Joint, and OSD Programming and Budgeting.
By contrast to other major areas of military affairs, there is no
lack of guidance to the entire defense community for budget and program
formulation. In this area the guidance ranges from general priorities in
functional areas to specific directions for individual items.
The formal Defense Department Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System (PPBS),44 and the day-to-day practices that give it life, have
two characteristics that inhibit a true revolution in military affairs.
The first is the lack of an institutional, procedural link to joint
doctrine. The second is the prevalence of threat-oriented marginal
analysis.
To be sure, the principal guidance documents and procedures relate
all elements of national military power to strategy and policy and
include all relevant participants. Because funds are never adequate to
provide for all needed military capabilities, PPBS does establish
priorities that transcend the services. Moreover, to a significant
degree, operational concepts and joint doctrine have a role in selected
functional areas, particularly within individual parts of the research
and development bureaucracy.
What is absent in PPBS is an overall joint doctrinal template by
which to rationalize current programs, including acquisition. Similarly,

there is no joint futures concept or force development vision by which
to rationalize research and development. No procedure is in existence
that would permit developing joint doctrinal measures of merit for
examining the sufficiency of funding within and across functional areas,
or within and across the services and defense agencies. Because there is
no joint futures concept, a number of attempts at overarching guidance
such as the "science and technology thrusts" have been developed.45
While these provide direction for selected areas considered of high
value by OSD, they are neither comprehensive nor helpful in establishing
priorities between current and future capabilities, between services, or
within services.
The second obstacle, threat-based marginal analysis, may be
removed if the changes in long-range planning under consideration by the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy46 are put in place. The problems
that the old procedure creates are an inability to find a suitable
substitute for the Soviet threat to use in research and analysis, and an
inability to develop options that consider trade-offs between functional
areas and services. If PPBS indeed completes the transition to
capabilities-based force planning and a joint futures concept is
developed, analysis and decision making based on and rationalized by
joint doctrine and joint concepts would be possible.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Returning to the opening refrain, whither goes the revolution
in military affairs? The short answer is that there is more
evolution than revolution in evidence.
The tables below provide an impressionistic summary of the
author's assessment of the current and potential future processes of
change in the three major areas of military affairs. The assessment
relates to the armed forces as a whole.
<PRE>
MAJOR AREA

REVOLUTION

Force Design
Training
Resources

EVOLUTION

CONTINUITY

X
X
X
Table 1.

1994 Assessment

-----------------------------------------------------------------------MAJOR AREA
Force Design
Training
Resources

REVOLUTION

EVOLUTION

CONTINUITY

X
X
X
Table 2.

Future Potential

-----------------------------------------------------------------------</pre>
Clearly there are elements in all the services that will have

profiles that differ significantly from this overall assessment. For
instance, revolutionary change is possible within this decade in the
manner of conducting close operations in high-intensity warfare if the
Army experiments currently underway to "digitize" succeed. Similarly, if
current initiatives to improve the timeliness and precision of the
attack of distant high value targets on land succeed, the resulting
synergy between deep and close operations can significantly enhance the
effectiveness and speed of theater campaigns. In the main, for the armed
forces of the United States, there is no obvious revolution in military
affairs on the horizon of the sort that resulted from the introduction
of the internal combustion engine or nuclear weapons. What revolutions
there may be are more akin to the introduction of "stealth" which
resulted in a significant improvement in a few battlefield functions,
but hardly revolutionized warfare.
Focusing on the major defense areas, revolution in doctrine will
be possible only to the extent that significantly different futures
concepts or their equivalent drive the process. There are no such
revolutionary concepts, service-unique or joint, in existence or under
development. The revolution, if it occurs, will be in the processes for
developing futures concepts within the defense establishment. The
introduction of concepts- based planning with policy direction from OSD
and force development directly linked to doctrine and concepts could
produce a revolution within, perhaps, a decade.
In the area of force design, revolution is possible provided
current initiatives to use distributed simulations expand within and
across services and are stimulated by truly innovative futures concepts.
The slow part of the process will, of necessity, be the field testing
phase. For complex organizations and materiel systems, this phase will
remain unavoidable regardless of how revolutionary the design phase
becomes.
In the area of training and leader development, revolution is
clearly possible. This will require the correct mix of joint and
service-unique elements, distributed simulations and field exercises.
Taken together, the revolutionary potentials that exist in force design
and training and leader development open the possibility for much more
rapid improvements in the American way of war than at any time in the
past. Whereas it took a generation to reshape the forces following
Vietnam, it could take perhaps half that time in the future to effect a
comparable renaissance.
Turning to resources, there is no alternative to evolution as the
upper limit to change. It is simply impossible to terminate activities
overnight. Moreover, however revolutionary the process of change becomes
at the design end, it will be necessary to maintain current capabilities
in being until a transition can be effected. The armed forces are likely
to remain too small to permit rapid major transformations that
significantly decrease near-term readiness.
History alone will judge what it means to have a revolution in
military affairs. The uncertainties that have always surrounded warfare
have a profound effect on the military profession, inclining it to
conservatism, setting evolution as the normal upper limit of the rate of
change. That characteristic is likely to remain central to the
profession.
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